The work discusses a basic proposition in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection (Bester, 1985) . By working out the sequence of market transactions, we show that the e¤ectiveness of collateral in avoiding equilibrium rationing depends on an assumption of uncontestability of the loan market. If contestability is restored to its proper place, the separation of borrower by means of su¢cient collateral does not impede the emergence of credit rationing, which results from a coordination failure among riskneutral banks. As a consequence, even in a risk-neutral environment with suitable endowments, the use of collateral in credit contracts could not be a socially e¢cient screening-device. Our conclusion on rationing does not stand in contrast with the general result of Gale (1996) .
Introduction
Since the seminal work of Bester (1985) , it has been generally taken for granted that in a risk-neutral environment, when su¢cient wealth is made available from a borrower's endowment, the competitive equilibrium of the credit market achieves perfect sorting, thus solving the adverse selection problem posed by Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) . In other words, the separation of borrowers, that is accomplished by means of 'unlimited' collateral, impedes equilibrium rationing. This conclusion has become a real cornerstone in the literature on credit markets with asymmetric information, as it has been shared by several diverse contributions (e.g., Bester 1987 , Besanko-Thakor 1987 , Hellwig 1987 , Stiglitz-Weiss 1992 , Schmidt-Mohr 1997 , and it has also been recalled by authors dealing with the more general problem of competition in markets with adverse selection (Gale 1996) . Our paper discusses this proposition by rendering explicit the whole sequence of market transactions, and considering the symmetric incentive-compatible equilibrium of the resulting market game. We point out that Bester's claim relies on an ad hoc assumption, which removes contestability of the loan market in presence of a rationing equilibrium. In fact, an arti…cial restriction of the strategies of the incumbent banks is being imposed, while this restriction does not equally hold for the no-rationing equilibrium. Conversely, if the game is correctly speci…ed, in the sense that the same extensive form and the same unrestricted strategy set is being considered for both kind of possible equilibria (rationing and no-rationing), then
Bester's conclusion is not valid. The result extends easily to the case in which a recourse opening of the credit market is being added. Then, a competitive equilibrium with separation of borrowers can in fact show rationing of their demand for credit, even when they have su¢cient collateral. As a direct consequence, one has that collateralization may turn out to be a socially-ine¢cient instrument to screen a borrower's riskiness. The paper is organized as follows:
in section 2, we illustrate the basic model; in section 3, we introduce the de…-nition of equilibrium and the extensive form of the game; section 4 deals with the central issue of the presence of rationing in an equilibrium; …nally, section 5 discusses the results of our analysis and their relationship with the above mentioned strands of literature.
The model
Given his purpose, Bester 1 obviously employs a model that reproduces the same basic structure of Stiglitz-Weiss analysis. All agents are risk-neutral and there are two types of entrepreneurs or …rms. Each entrepreneur has a …xed-scale investment opportunity, while the random returns of investments of the two classes of …rms are ordered according to the mean preserving spread criterion (mps) 2 . Banks cannot directly observe the type of borrower they deal with, so adverse selection may arise. The supply of deposits to the banking system is a continuous and strictly increasing function of the rate of interest paid on deposits. In a credit contract, banks may charge collateral as a guarantee for loan repayments when the borrower defaults. Pledging collateral is costly to borrowers, who face a generic and constant unit cost. Moreover, they have a collateral endowment which is more than su¢cient to fully guarantee the loan value. Symbols are as follows:
I is the …xed scale of investment, e R i is their random return, taking values in
, where i = a; b stands for the type of …rm we are considering; F i (R) > 0, 8R > 0, is the distribution function: assuming that type b entrepreneurs are more risky than type a, in the sense of a mean-preserving spread, we have Bester (1985, p. 851) . On the de…nition of mean preserving spreads see RothschildStiglitz (1970) .
can o¤er as collateral is separated from their monetary holdings.
The debt contract the banks use to lend funds to …rms declares the borrower to be insolvent anytime the sum of total return on investments and collateral is not su¢cient for loan repayment: that is when R i + C < B(1 + r). In this circumstance the bank seizes the whole disposable value R i + C, otherwise it gets the contractual repayment B(1 + r). Bester considers only contracts for which the collateral does not exceed the face value of the loan C B(1 + r)
(otherwise default would be trivially excluded from the model). The bank's expected rate of return on a loan contract (r; C) to borrower i is
From the same contract, entrepreneur i expects to gain a total pro…t which is given as
For C < B(1 + r), the mps ordering implies that
and
For a given contract , a bank obtains a higher rate of return on a loan to a less-risky borrower, while the utility of a riskier borrower is higher than that of a safer one.
Totally di¤erentiating expressions (1) and (2) with respect to r and C, and simplifying, we get the following marginal rates of substitution
These ratios clearly indicate that each kind of borrower has an indi¤erence curve which is steeper in absolute value than its isopro…t curve, because i ( ) < i ( ). Moreover, it can easily be shown that both the isoreturn curves are strictly convex, so that functions i ( ) are quasiconvex. The property is not grasped by Bester, who believes these curves not to be concave everywhere 3 . However, in this model, a su¢cient condition to obtain a separating equilibrium is represented by
assumption which amounts to establishing a single-crossing property for the isoreturn curves. In fact, for any given contract, we immediately get that the indi¤erence curve of riskier investors, those of type b, becomes steeper than that of less risky investors, b ( ) < a ( ). The same goes for the isopro…t curves. Thus, the separate indi¤erence (or isopro…t) curves will have one intersection point at most. As far as their shape is concerned, in what follows it will be more convenient to adopt Bester's representation. Finally, two important features of his model have to be emphasized:
Assumption 1: "banks act as perfect competitors, that is, each bank takes the rate of interest on deposits and the set of credit o¤ers by competing banks as given and as independent of its own actions";
3 Convexity of the isoreturn curves holds when we consider both a continuous and a discrete random variable. On the contrary, Bester believes these curves to have mainly a concave behaviour, which in turn implies that the expected utility is quasiconcave. See Bester (1985) , note 8, p. 851, and …gures 1 and 2 -respectively at p. 852 and following. Standard renditions of this model employ concave isoreturn curves; cf. Goodhart (1989) and Freixas-Rochet (1998) .
Assumption 2: an entrepreneur who is rationed at his preferred contract may successively apply for the other contract at the same bank 4 .
As we shall see later on, assumption 2 is crucial for obtaining Bester's conclusion on the absence of rationing.
De…nition of equilibrium and the extensive form of the market game
We are now going to get a preliminary insight into the basic de…nition of equilibrium and into the sequence of transactions, that are featured by the model we have just presented.
De…nition 1
A credit market equilibrium is a situation in which "borrowers choose among contracts to maximize expected pro…ts: (i) each contract and yields zero pro…t to the bank; (ii) any additional credit o¤er will make no pro…ts; and (iii) there is no excess supply of funds" 5 .
This equilibrium is shortly denoted as a tuple f( ; ); ( ; ); g, where
, is the fraction of …rms that receive credit under the terms of j , that is to say each …rm's identical probability of getting credit 6 ; moreover, by requirement (i), i ( j ) = . Credit rationing occurs if some entrepreneur i faces a positive probability of being rejected at contract j , which he prefers, and at the same time i ( j ) > W (1 + ). Notice that the sign of strict inequality comes from the need to satisfy entrepreneurs' participation constraint to the credit market:
where the second term is the alternative return the entrepreneur can get from his monetary wealth; this condition is also known as the individual rationality constraint (IR). In an equilibrium with separation of di¤erent borrowers, their incentive-compatibility constraints (IC) must also hold:
This equilibrium is depicted in …g.1, where a and b represent the borrowers'
indi¤erence curves while and denote a bank's isopro…t curve of the corresponding type. As long as the proportion between high-risk and low-risk borrowers is so high as to exclude the existence of a dominating pooling contract 7 , the competitive equilibrium -a Nash equilibrium -exists, and is given by the separating equilibrium shown in …g. 1, ( ; ). Bester's contention is that in this framework there can be no rationing of any type of borrowers at ( ; ), that is to say = = 1. To address this issue, it will be useful randomly-chosen borrowers obtain no credit at all, while the remaining ones get the required loan-size. 7 The pooling isopro…t must not lie in the region that is delimitated by isopro…t
; indi¤erence curve a, r-axis and contract . Bester assumes this condition to be satis…ed, see Bester (1985) , note 12, p. 853.
describing more precisely the sequence of market transactions which is posited by Bester.
With regard to the sequence of transactions, the timing of the model can be illustrated as follows (…g.2):
In the time-line above, we have uninformed agents (banks) moving …rst: they devise debt contracts to be o¤ered to the informed ones (borrowers) (see Hellwig 1987) . But price terms of this contract, i.e. j , depend on the rate of interest on deposits, so an equilibrium on this market must be computed before banks can actually o¤er loans. If so, banks who have decided to enter the loans market must go …rst on the deposits market, where they demand a quantity of loanable funds corresponding to the credit probabilities they are going to o¤er and to the expected number of borrowers. The matching of these demands with the supply of funds from savers, L S ( ), determines a notional equilibrium rate of interest on deposits, f . This, in principle, need not be the actual equilibrium rate as long as trading is not de…nitively closed (compare however assumption 3 below). On the other hand, when o¤ers are made by banks, a generic borrower can observe this rate and he accordingly chooses one of the two alternative options: investing his liquidity on the deposits market or applying for his preferred credit-o¤er at a single bank. Once credit applications by borrowers have been done, banks randomly choose the individual loans that are going to be …nanced.
We are now in the position to describe in some detail the functioning of markets along with the extensive form of the game which a representative bank plays with a generic borrower of a speci…ed kind. In Bester's model a symmetric separating-equilibrium is considered, in which di¤erent banks and di¤erent entrepreneurs of a given risk-class behave the same way. The rate of interest on the market for deposits in a symmetric equilibrium in which banks o¤er credit with a positive probability, and in which …rms demand loans, can be determined as
where, obviously, the right-hand term of the equation is the banks' total demand of funds.
There is a large number of banks, E, and the market for loans is contestable.
A number of banks H < E that is su¢cient to serve the whole market for loans, will enter the credit market, therefore a borrower can be assured that j is the actual probability of receiving a loan. The extensive form of the simple game played by a representative bank, which plans to enter the credit market, and by a generic borrower of type i may be depicted as in …gure 3
below. Herein, S j ( j ; j ) is the loan o¤er -which probability determines the equilibrium rate of interest on deposits , i ( j ) = and i i ( j );
while X is the absolute value of the loss that a bank incurs when entrepreneurs should refuse its contract o¤er: i.e. the value of the deposit contracts. Strategy E denotes exit from the credit market, A is the acceptance of the loan o¤er; L and NL, respectively, stand for according a loan or not, and such strategies are randomly chosen by the bank. As for trading on the market for deposits is concerned, it must be observed that the following assumption has to be made:
Assumption 3: Trading on this market is completed before borrowers accept credit o¤ers, so the deposits market precedes the loans market, i.e. de…nitive …xing of the rate of interest and execution of the deposit contracts -by banks and savers -take place before the market for loans closes.
On the contrary, suppose that banks can sign deposit contracts after having observed the entrepreneurs' decision to accept or not the loan o¤er. Then, when borrowers found it favourable to refuse their preferred credit o¤er, be- This explains the necessity of assumption 3.
Now that the basic framework of Bester's model has been described, let us consider a simple implication of his pivotal Assumption 2.
Lemma 1
Assumption 2 implies a second stage of the credit market, in which banks o¤er the new set of contracts to rationed borrowers and demand additional funding on the deposits market.
Proof. Suppose not. Then assumption 2 would entail a market in which banks demand funding just once and o¤er borrowers a lottery over loan contracts ( ; ), where each lottery yields zero pro…t to a bank. The lottery is such that a type a …rm will be o¤ered contract and a credit-probability , while in the event that it should be rationed at this contract (an outcome which has probability 1 ) this …rm will be o¤ered contract and a credit-probability . Mutatis mutandum, the same goes for a type b …rm.
In this market environment, Bester's IR and IC constraints (7)-(9) and the zero-pro…t condition i ( j ) = do not hold anymore, while the proof of his Theorem 1 is inapplicable.
Before we go further, another minor -but useful -observation can be advanced in relation to the di¤erential information among banks, that can arise at stage two of the credit market: with a separating equilibrium, at the end of the …rst credit market an incumbent bank knows the risk features of its customers/borrowers, while a bank which is a potential entrant does not. This shows the feasibility of the pivotal assumption 2. Obviously, it is due to the fact that -in the …rst credit market -the equilibrium pair of contracts ( ; )
is incentive compatible and self-selection of borrowers is induced. So, Lemma 1 tells us that, in the event of rationing, assumption 2 yields a second stage of the credit market, a stage in which incumbent banks o¤er a speci…c contract -namely the one that was designed for the other type -to borrowers they have just rationed. Thus, with regard to the extensive form of the game, the presence of rationing in equilibrium adds a second game tree to the initial one;
this new tree has the same general structure of the …rst (see …g. 3 above) and di¤ers only in the agents payo¤s. Accordingly, we can point out
Remark 1
The extensive form of the whole game is not indepedent from the type of equilibrium that has to be determined.
Equilibrium with rationing or not?
We are now going to discuss the central issue: what credit probabilities ( ; ) must be assigned to the incentive-compatible equilibrium pair of contracts ( ; )? Bester's theorem 1 argues that these probabilities equal one.
Proposition 1 (Bester's result)
Let f( ; ); ( ; ); g be a credit market equilibrium at stage one, and let both contracts and be demanded by entrepreneurs. Moreover these contracts are incentive compatible. Then in a credit market equilibrium there is no rationing at or at , i.e. = = 1.
Proof. See Bester (1985) , pp. 853-854
Bester's proof is by contradiction. He denies that credit probabilities equal one in the incentive-compatible equilibrium, and then shows that, in presence of rationing of some fraction of …rms, there exists a deviating credit o¤er which warrants a positive pro…t to a generic entrant bank. This is a contradiction to requirement (i) of the de…nition of an equilibrium 8 , thus the proposition is proven.
Comment. Anyway, the deviating o¤er could be allowed only by the way of assumption 2. In fact, this assumption puts, in the second stage of the credit market, a completely-arbitrary restriction on the strategy set of the incumbent banks. In the …rst credit market, these banks can freely determine their credit o¤ers, while in the second market assumption 2 forces their strategy set -for a rationed borrower of a given type -to be made up of the remaining contract o¤ered at stage one: ( ; ) for a type b …rm, ( ; ) for a type a …rm. On the contrary, entrant banks -Bester's "competing banks" -have access to an unrestricted set of strategies. In this setting, incumbent banks do not actually o¤er the above contracts to rationed borrowers 9 , while their reservation utility reduces to W (1 + ). If so, a deviating pro…table o¤er by an entrant bank can be easily made to exist.
These observations clearly indicate that we could be in presence of a formal fallacy -due to assumption 2 -which should invalidate Bester's result. To check this, the logical problem has to be properly set up, that is: a) the strategy set of incumbent banks must not be restricted when there is rationing-as it is actually contemplated for the no-rationing equilibrium; b) the extensive form of the game tree must be given independently from the type of equilibrium we are solving for.
These two logical requirements imply the removal of assumption 2. Therefore, we can limit ourselves to ascertain what happens in a credit market equilibrium which game tree is entirely described by …gure 3 above, that is stage one of the credit market. Herein, we derive our main result
Proposition 2
Let f( ; ); ( ; ); g be a credit market equilibrium at stage one, and let both contracts and be demanded by entrepreneurs. Moreover these contracts are incentive compatible and assumption 2 does not hold. Then in a credit market equilibrium there can be rationing at ( ; ); i.e. = < 1.
Proof. See appendix.
Comment. Essentially, we prove the impossibility to construct a pro…table deviating o¤er in presence of rationing. It can be even remarked that an identical result is obtained if we are ready to abandon requirement b), thus allowing for a second stage of the credit market 10 . Nevertheless, note that this recourse opening would have no economic or behavioural justi…cation in this static credit model: banks have already screened and rationed their borrowers, and have no motivation for o¤ering rationed borrowers a new contract. We conclude that Bester's result on the absence of rationing is a circular reasoning based on the arbitrary restriction of the strategy set which is imposed, in the occurrence of rationing, on the sole incumbent banks.
10 In this case it su¢ces to apply our proof to the subgame consisting of the second stage of the credit market. The equilibrium is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium with rationing both at stage one and stage two of the credit market.
Discussion
In this model, we have argued that an equilibrium with separation of borrowers is compatible with rationing. If banks …x a credit probability less than one, then equilibrium rationing 11 arises as a coordination failure among riskneutral agents. When the market for loans is contestable 12 there is no way for banks to design a pro…table deviant contract-pair that satis…es individual rationality of entrepreneurs and enhances their probability of credit.
The occurrence of rationing in a separating equilibrium questions the e¢ciency of collateral as a screening instrument of borrowers' riskiness. Hitherto, when compared to a pooling equilibrium, the costs associated with the introduction of collateral have been justi…ed by the social gains ensuing from the elimination of rationing in a separating equilibrium, viz. a strict increase in the number of social e¢cient investment projects undertaken, i.e. projects for which E n e R o I(1 + ) > 0. Conversely, as we have argued, credit rationing can resist the introduction of collateral, then the number of these projects is not necessarily higher than that of a pooling equilibrium, while less-risky borrowers have to pay the cost for it, out of their collateralizable wealth. In the separating equilibrium we examined, social surplus V is given as:
where N is the number of entrepreneurs who receives a loan, while the second addend represents the cost of pledging collateral, borne by type a entrepreneurs. Clearly, if the number of …nanced projects is not su¢ciently increasing, to compensate for collateral costs, social surplus will diminish and the use of collateral in credit contracts will not result in a socially-e¢cient outcome 13 .
Finally, we can discuss the relationship of our analysis with the literature. To our knowledge, the ‡aws of Bester (1985) analysis have never been detected.
For this reason, perhaps, it has been generally taken for granted that introducing collateral in an analytical framework à la Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) would have de…nitely excluded rationing from its credit market equilibrium 14 . We note that our conclusion o¤ers a substantial, and totally unexpected, extension of the validity of the …rst Stiglitz-Weiss explanation for rationing, which relied on pooling and on a di¤erent concept of equilibrium. Basically, to be emphasized is that rationing in a separating allocation, with risk-neutral entrepreneurs and a solution that is not bound by borrower's endowment of collateral, can now be achieved. Contrary to Stiglitz-Weiss (1992) , to explain equilibrium creditrationing, we show that there is no need to assume the joint presence of adverse selection, moral hazard and the entrepreneurs' risk-aversion. But, most of all, the characteristic that confers generality to our result is the slackness of the collateral constraint. In fact, when indivisible projects are available, a binding constraint has constituted the key assumption to reach a credit-rationing equilibrium in presence of both collateral and separation of borrowers. This binding condition has been equally shared by models with diverse speci…-13 Anyway, consider that an increase in N will be partly o¤set by the following increase in the equilibrium rate of interest on deposits, and in the size of collateral costs as well.
14 Stiglitz-Weiss (1992) themselves implicitly adhered to Bester's view, by considerably modifying their model in order to defend the possibility of rationing as an equilibrium phenomenon.
surprisingly, as we have examined Bester's model, our competitive-equilibrium concept di¤ers from that of Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) , where banks maximized the depositors' rate of return as they were monopolistic competitors on the market for loanable funds. Nevertheless, it is identical to the Stiglitz-Weiss (1992) concept. As for this point, observe that: a) the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) de…nition of equilibrium is a more conducive assumption for equilibrium rationing (see Chan-Thakor 1987) ; b) considering banks that are monopolistic competitors for deposits would easily bring about equilibrium-rationing in Bester's framework 16 . Therefore, the use of a di¤erent concept of equilibrium adds to the signi…cance of our main conclusion.
Remarkably, our proposition about the coexistence of screening and equilibrium rationing does not stand in contrast with the results of Gale (1996) . This general contribution follows a walrasian approach, in a risk-neutral context where each contract makes up a single market and agents take the probability of being able to exchange any particular contract as given. Price terms are exogenous, i.e. de…ned only implicitly by contracts which are indeed identi…ed with probability distributions over a set of outcomes, so that markets are to be balanced by adjusting the probability of trade. Herein, Gale proves that equilibrium rationing will not be observed unless agents are indi¤erent to trade 15 Besanko-Thakor (1987) and Bester (1987) , diverging partly from Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) , employ a perfectly elastic supply of deposits along with risk-neutrality. On their part, Stiglitz-Weiss (1992) start from a not perfectly elastic supply of deposits and risk averse entrepreneurs. 16 Here, the increase in the interest rate on deposits, which ensues to the deviantbank o¤er, invalidates the proof of proposition 1. 
can be determined. Afterwards, we can choose r j as the highest value that satis…es r < r j , so that i ( j ) > i ( j ) with r j > r j would generally follow.
Note, however, that can be arbitrarily near to 1 and, as a consequence, r j and r j can be practically indistinguishable (r j ' r j ). In practice, it is di¢cult to a¢rm that the sought after deviating o¤er will exist for any < 1. This is con…rmed by a more rigorous analysis.
In an incentive-compatible equilibrium i = j: By means of Lagrange's formula on …nite increments, we can express the positive increment in borrowers' expected utility, which would follow from an increase in the probability of receiving a loan, as the type-j utility function with respect to r. Note that r j is the level of the rate of interest which absorbs all of the 'surplus' ensuing from the increase in the credit probability; r j is a decreasing function of :
The increment in utility given by (11) will be partly o¤set by the increase in the rate of interest, which is required to yield a positive pro…t to a deviating bank. Employing again Lagrange's formula, the decrement in utility can be given as r j ( 00 j )(r j r j )
where 00 j = (r 00 j ; C j ) and r j < r 
Obviously, the condition cannot be satis…ed whenever r j = r j . However, the required inequality need not to be satis…ed even in the case of interest, that is when r j < r j . In fact, the second order derivative of the expected utility with respect to the rate of interest has a uniform sign: (14) are greater than one and we cannot tell whether this inequality is satis…ed or not. Moreover, for values of approaching 1 it can be demonstrated that the inequality is certainly violated.
As for this, consider that = 1 implies r j = r j = r j , while from < 1 it follows r j > r j and r j > r j : Moreover, when ' 1 the left and right-hand members of the inequality are approximately equal to one, because r j ; r j ; r 0 j and r 00 j can be taken to be as practically coincident. Then, the e¤ects of a decrease in -in the neighbourhood of 1 -can be reckoned by means of the …rst-order derivative with respect to r j ; valued at r j = r j . The e¤ects on the left-hand and on the right-hand member of (14) are, respectively: 
Both derivatives are negative, but observe that the modulus of the former
